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Introduction 
 
It is increasingly difficult to distinguish natural events from those influenced by 
human actions.  In disaster mental health literature, there are usually three categorizations 
of disasters: natural, technological and complex (Rosenfeld, Caye, Ayalon, & Lahod, 
2005).   Technological disasters refer to such events as oil spills, nuclear power plant 
explosions and chemical spills and emissions.  Complex disasters usually mean acts of 
violence or terrorism, such as the September 11 attacks or the violent tragedies of 
Oklahoma City and in the community of Columbine, Colorado.  Natural disasters refer to 
occurrences such as hurricanes, Tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, mud slides, 
and volcanic eruptions.   
 Although many ‘natural’ disasters are caused by the shifting of tectonic plates or 
the interactions of bodies of water with atmospheric conditions, they are not separable 
from the consequences of human actions.  Increased human settlement of flood plains, 
hillsides prone to mudslides and other areas vulnerable to ‘natural’ disasters place 
increasing numbers of people at risk, for example.  As international agreements such as 
1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) attest, scientific communities across the globe have long identified 
‘natural’ events such as the melting of polar ice caps which increase the risk of flooding 
and the frequency and severity of storms as consequences of human actions.  
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 Furthermore, researchers in various fields including public health, economics, 
geography, and environmental sciences have established that the risk factors are not 
random.  The ongoing environmental risks for poor people and people of color are 
consistently higher than for white people and those who are economically privileged 
(Faber & Krieg, 2001; NAS, 2002; Quintero-Somaini, 2004). The socially disadvantaged 
are more likely to live near chemical plants, landfills, and other contaminated lands.  
There is a greater likelihood that they will be living in more vulnerable, substandard 
dwellings served by older, less well maintained infrastructures (e.g. roads, sewers).  They 
are more prone to be living in overcrowded, environmentally risky areas.  Much of public 
housing, built during the 1950s and 1960s, tends to cluster in areas that are along major 
transportation routes, reclaimed land or adjacent to industrial facilities (Cutter, 2005).   
The effects of disasters on those living in such already compromised environments are 
predictably worse; the most disadvantaged members of the most disadvantaged 
communities suffer the greatest losses when disaster strikes (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999). 
 Hurricane Katrina was, according to President Bush, "one of the worst natural 
disasters in our nation's history" (CNN, 2005).  But given the facts outlined above, the 
devastations of Katrina cannot be properly understood as the results of a force of nature 
of human manufacture.  The tally of damage and destruction suffered by the Gulf Coast 
in the wake of the hurricane was indeed profound.  More than 1000 lives were lost; 
homes and property were destroyed.  Included in the debris of vanished businesses, jobs 
and obliterated communities and neighborhoods were the remnants of scattered families 
and shattered lives.  But the damages incurred were not randomly distributed.  The level 
of devastation and the predicted likelihood of recovery of neighborhoods and 
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communities corresponded with the amount of political and socio-economic capital held 
by neighborhoods and communities prior to the hurricane.  Why does then, the discourse 
of “natural disaster” persist?  What are the consequences of constructing Katrina as a 
“natural” rather than a manufactured disaster?  What material consequences ensue from 
such a construction and whom does such a construction benefit?   
 We analyze in this paper the significance of this discourse of “natural disasters” 
through the framework of social ecology, "a coherent radical critique of current social, 
political, and anti-ecological trends" as well as "a reconstructive, ecological, 
communitarian, and ethical approach to society," a radical view of ecology and of 
social/political systems originally associated with the work of Murray Bookchin (Vanek, 
2000)}.  Since its development in the 1960’s, the concept of social ecology has been used 
in various fields outside of environmental ecology as a frame through which to highlight 
“the dynamic relations between people and their surroundings” (Stokols, 2000).  We use 
the term here to indicate our view that a complex interaction of factors constitutes the 
unique set of circumstances which shape the effects of a particular disaster.  The social 
ecology of model contests, in this sense, the neutralist discourse of “natural disasters” by 
underscoring the numerous interdependent social forces which shape the context in 
which disasters occur.  These forces include the political economy, which refers to the 
historically contingent, recursive interactions between politics and economics (Evans & 
Stephens, 1988), which forms the context of what is possible, probable, and actually done 
in anticipation of and response to natural disasters.  The dynamics of racism and 
discrimination interact with the political economy and contribute to critical decisions, 
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which shape the social ecology of  ‘natural’ disasters’, such as where toxic chemicals are 
stored and whether or not levies are adequately fortified.   
The Social Ecology of Natural Disasters – the case of Katrina 
 
The destruction wrought by the Hurricane Katrina was profound and multilayered.  
The breached levees resulted in the flooding of up to 80% of the city with water rising 25 
feet in some places(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, September 17, 2005).  Potable water and food were unavailable; there 
were no stores or restaurants at which to purchase them, and no banks or ATMs at which 
to obtain money to purchase goods even if they had been available.  There was no 
electricity and no phone service with which to report such problems even if there had 
been any municipal services to which they could be reported.  Transportation was 
severely curtailed and streets were covered with contaminated mud, branches, 
clapboards, shingles, and nails, which made even walking hazardous.  Life without air 
conditioners in the stultifying heat posed not only discomfort but serious health risks, 
particularly for the elderly and infirm.  Along with the loss of private property such as 
houses and household goods, parks, meeting spaces, civic offices, recreational facilities—
infrastructure of public life—were damaged, often beyond repair.  Daily routines, critical 
for all, but particularly for children, were ruptured with no foreseeable return.   
Viewed through the lens of social ecology, disasters, including those constructed 
as “natural” ones, occur within a context, a complex social terrain constituted through the 
interaction of many social forces.  We know, for instance, that four of the greatest risks 
for suffering adverse consequences in natural disasters are overcrowding, poor 
infrastructure of dwellings, poor health and nutrition, and political instability (Rosenfeld, 
 5 
Caye, Ayalon, & Lahod, 2005).  To put it simply, poor populations, and particularly poor 
minority populations who tend, in the U.S., to be more likely to be poor than whites, are 
more likely than the wealthy and the privileged to suffer adverse effects of natural 
disasters.  The effects of a “natural” disaster are not random, in other words.  They cannot 
be conceived as isolated effects solely attributable to a “naturally” occurring phenomenon 
but must be understood to the effects of existing social inequalities.  That “Thousands 
and thousands of modest houses in low-lying urban neighborhoods and others in white 
and black suburbs were inundated while the higher-value French Quarter and downtown 
remained dry” (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 2005, p.1), 
cannot be explained simply as a fact of nature. 
Furthermore, past resources influence the acquisition of future resources, and after 
a disaster, already socially isolated and oppressed populations find it incommensurately 
more difficult to recover (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999).  Poor people and people of color are 
less likely to have savings, insurance, access to credit, friends and relatives with 
resources to spare, and other cushions which help people to recover from disasters 
(Brown et al., 2003; Shapiro, 2004).  When they are relocated they are more likely to 
encounter prejudice, hostility, cultural insensitivity than to feel as if they are in a place 
where they feel comfortable, secure and valued (Wilkerson, 2005, October 9).  They are 
also more apt to be the subjects of narratives, whether through words or pictures, which 
emphasize negative tendencies, exaggerate pathology, and exacerbate low morale.  In 
other words, not only the immediate effects of a disaster, but the long term recovery 
possibilities from a disaster are, therefore, mediated by the socio-economic structures in 
which communities and individuals are emplaced prior to a disaster. “What happened to 
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greater New Orleans when Katrina struck had a lot to do with what was happening there 
before the disaster—that is plain.” (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy 
Program, 2005, p.20) 
The specificities of Katrina’s impact on New Orleans starkly illustrate these 
points.  67.3% of New Orleans’ population (compared to 12.3% for the U.S.) prior to the 
hurricane were African American (The Urban Institute, 2005).  Even in a markedly poor 
city (27.9% of the city was poor compared to 12.4 % for the U.S.), African Americans 
families were disproportionately poor, comprising 91.2 % of the total of poor families of 
all races in the city.  New Orleans was a city of great disparities, a city of distinct 
neighborhoods highly segregated by color and income (Cose, 2005, September 19).  Of 
its 177 census tracts there are 81 in which none of the respondents to the 2000 Census 
identified themselves as Non-Hispanic White.  In these 81 tracts 89% identified 
themselves as Black.  Likewise, there are 35 tracts in which none of the Census 
respondents identified them selves as Black.  In those tracts 83% of the population listed 
White as their race on the Census.  Forty seven percent of whites in New Orleans live in 
census tracts where none listed their race as “Black only” on the 2000 Census.  
Socioeconomic status follows these lines of segregation.  Over all in New Orleans the 
median household income is $27,133, for Whites it is $40,390 and for Blacks it is 
$21,485.  One percent of white households and 8% of black households receive public 
assistance.  Overall, 28% of New Orleans residents live below the poverty line.  Among 
Whites, however, only 11% live below the poverty line while 35% of Blacks live below 
the poverty line.  “As a result, blacks and whites were living in quite literally different 
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worlds before the storm hit” (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 
2005, p. 6). 
For Blacks and many other people of color, the consequences of high rates of 
poverty and racial segregation have been ruinous.  Within the context of the U.S., the 
kind of political instability the disaster literature cites as a risk factor is well demonstrated 
by the fact that pre-Katrina New Orleans suffered a murder rate 10 times the national 
average (MSNBC, 2005).  The New Orleans police force was plagued by corruption in 
the years prior to the hurricane and was accused of misconduct and brutality both during 
and after the storm (Foster, 2005).  Given the city’s staggering poverty rates coupled with 
the well-established facts that “Evidence of racial and ethnic disparities in healthcare is, 
with few exceptions, remarkably consistent across a range of illnesses and healthcare 
services” (The National Academy of Sciences, 2002), it is unsurprising that ill health and 
nutrition were evident in New Orleans.  As a whole, the population of New Orleans 
experiences a high burden of infectious diseases.  Compared to the State of Louisiana 
overall, New Orleans has 2.76 times the state’s rate of tuberculosis cases, 1.35 times the 
state’s rate of Syphilis cases, 1.8 times the state’s rate of Gonorrhea cases and 1.96 times 
the state’s rate of Chlamydia cases.  Of the 12,090 people living with HIV/AIDS in the 
State of Louisiana, 4,483 of them live in New Orleans, a very high number considering 
that New Orleans represents about 10% of the population of the state.  These statistics 
serve as a proxy for the overall health of the city’s residents and suggest a high disease 
burden and poor pubic health.    
The term “natural disaster” with its connotations of an event outside of human 
control and manufacture – in other words, outside of the realm of the political– belies the 
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social ecology of Hurricane Katrina.  This observation is not meant to negate the power 
of nature, but rather to underscore that the ecology of the disaster encompassed much 
more than the fact of the hurricane itself.  The areas worst affected by Katrina were those 
populated by poor people of color, already living under risky environmental conditions in 
dangerous and unstable neighborhoods.   
In this regard, Katrina’s impacts were not just massive, but uneven. Broad as it 
was, the destruction was not uniform. Black people and poor people bore the 
brunt of the devastation because—for the most part—they lived most often in 
the lower-lying, more flood-prone sections of the city, such as Mid- City or the 
Lower Ninth Ward. Or as the Louisiana State University geographer Craig 
Colten observes: “With greater means and power, the white population occupied 
the better-drained sections of the city, while blacks typically inhabited the 
swampy `rear’ districts.”  (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy 
Program, 2005, p.13) 
  
In New Orleans, “hydrology and topography have long intersected with race, class, and 
sociology” (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 2005, p.13).  The 
levees that broke were obviously of human manufacture but more importantly, the web of 
decision making involved in their lack of fortification, despite repeated warnings from 
various sources, were political judgments made with the foreknowledge of which 
neighborhoods and which communities would suffer most from such decisions.  It 
represented “a malign intersection of weather and water with a man-made social and 
racial topography that had been created over decades”(The Brookings Institution 
Metropolitan Policy Program, 2005, p.20).  
The evacuation plans instituted prior to the hurricane, a plan constructed upon the 
assumptions of a particular normative lifestyle, called for a mass departure protocol 
predicated on the use of privately owned cars.  However, “the metropolitan area’s sharp 
geographical differences in household type and well-being ordained that those who lived 
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in flooded areas were less likely to own their homes and more likely to live in rental 
apartments, include children living in single-parent households, and lack access to a car”  
(The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 2005, p.17).  Both the decision 
to channel funds away from the levee projects and to formulate a plan for evacuating the 
City via private means may have been plans targeting the greatest good for the greatest 
number.  But they were formulated within a calculus of entrenched social and economic 
hierarchies which assign differential values to different neighborhoods, communities, and 
populations.  As such, they were plans which left behind those who did not fit  the 
designated normative order, the most vulnerable members of society.  They include the 
aged, the infirm, the poor, population subgroups whose literal and socio-economic 
mobility are compromised even under the best of circumstances.   
The difference between the discourse of “natural disasters” and that of social 
ecology can perhaps be better understood in terms of differential locating of the narrative 
frame.  A natural disaster discourse frames the issues of damage and recovery narrowly 
and linearly, while the discourse of ecology frames the issues widely and complexly.  The 
former construction begins the narrative with the onset of a precipitating event such as a 
hurricane, and limits the tally to the damages specifically and directly linked to the 
hurricane event.  The latter, ecological construction locates the beginning of the narrative 
much earlier, taking into its accounting the prior existing inequalities and vulnerabilities 
which mediate the risks for adverse effects.  It includes in its reckoning a wider and far 
more complex web of social phenomena that mediate the kind of damages an individual 
or a community suffers. 
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Thus, from the perspective of a “natural disaster” discourse, Hurricane Katrina 
can be framed as a single event, a storm that gathered and caused destruction when it 
made landfall.  From the social ecological perspective, however, the narrative of the 
disaster would recognize the differential impact of the hurricane; it would encompass the 
ongoing neglect of the City of New Orleans and its poor and largely black neighborhoods 
by the federal government.  This assessment of damages would take into account the 
particular geographic location of African Americans in economically devastated, low-rent 
and low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans which were disproportionately damaged by 
the storm.  That narrative necessarily includes the historical exploitation and oppression 
of African Americans in the U.S., a story that reaches back centuries and features the 
institution of slavery, the Civil War, the “Black Codes,” Reconstruction, and the legacies 
of racism that was structured into the New Deal and other subsequent social welfare 
programs (Frymer, Strolovitch, & Warren, 2005).  In other words, Katrina would be 
placed within the context of a larger history of discrimination which has resulted in the 
current political economy of stratification that leaves particular populations with 
diminished economic, political and social capital to utilize for storm protection and 
recovery.  A narrative framed from the perspective of social ecology would not formulate 
the problem as the result of a random encounter with a natural disaster. 
The social ecology model challenges the validity of the discourse of ‘natural’ 
disasters.  From our perspective, the pervasive formulation of the series of events 
surrounding this hurricane as a “natural” phenomenon is a construction that occludes the 
complex reality of the events and the socio-political context in which they occurred.  This 
view that the devastation wrought in Hurricane Katrina’s wake was the results of an 
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inescapable force beyond human control obscures the economic and social factors which 
mediate —magnify or minimize—the impact of disasters on the communities and people 
who experience them.  This formulation serves to mask the underlying social 
stratification and oppression that shape the kind of impact disasters have on different 
places and populations.  It serves as a cover for the political exploitation and ineptitude 
that impede socially just recovery efforts, and supports the perpetuation of discriminatory 
practices towards the poor  
Since Hurricane Katrina, the nation (and world) witnessed the President of the 
United States addressing a dark and empty New Orleans, flooded in the glare of arc lights 
fueled by a generator brought in for the purpose of this staged event (as the city had no 
electricity), vowing that the city would be rebuilt.  But what did this mean?  It is clear 
that New Orleans must be rebuilt, and that this task cannot be accomplished without 
massive governmental support.  It is equally clear that New Orleans should not be 
restored to its former racially divided, poverty-stricken, flood-prone design. “To replicate 
such a place more or less as it was now that the storm is over would be not just short-
sided and wasteful, but wrong.(The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 
2005, p.2).  Viewed from the social ecology perspective, however, that “what was 
happening before Katrina owes at least in part to government policies, including federal 
ones” (The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, 2005, p.20).  The 
government’s past history in New Orleans, its public housing policies responsible for 
building and maintaining racially segregated enclaves of poverty, its highway 
development projects which promoted mass settlements of reclaimed wetlands and flood 
plains, all begs the question of what kind of city it will rebuild. 
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What will be rebuilt, and for whom, and how?  Already people are losing homes 
as they default on mortgages.  Others are being evicted for non-payment of rent (Davis, 
2005).  Demoralized and dispirited residents are selling their property at bargain prices, 
often to speculators who take advantage of their desperation (Davis, 2005).  Will the poor 
be able to return to their pre-disaster neighborhoods?  Will people of color find that the 
segregated quarters where they lived in poverty are now no longer available to them 
because they are developed for middle and upper middle class white people?  Are we in 
the midst of witnessing massive “ethnic cleansing” in the wake of the hurricane (Davis, 
2005)?   
Who will rebuild New Orleans and at what cost?  There is already much debate 
about how such rebuilding should be funded and whether other programs for those in 
need should be slashed to pay the costs (Reidl, 2005).   To date, the federal government 
has not adequately funded reconstruction of the devastated Gulf Coast.  In the absence of 
reliable concrete offers of federal aid, the State of Louisiana is engaged in a similar 
debate: what programs should be slashed in order to rebuild schools, roads, homes and 
other infrastructure in distressed areas (Steinhauer, 2005, )?  Who will perform the labor 
and at what wages?  Who will and will not return to the city?  What contractors will 
benefit from the rebuilding effort?  Will a federal government which has consistently 
allowed corporations to exploit the exigencies of war and disaster as opportunities for 
profit, use Hurricane Katrina as an opening for the privatization of cities—rebuilt by 
Halliburton, under contracts that pay construction workers wages below federal 
guidelines? Will environmental regulations be relaxed even further?  Will reconstruction 
draw in those who can afford to buy and rent the new townhouses (affluent immigrants), 
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while former residents (poor emigrants) are scattered and disappear from public 
consciousness?   
The post-disaster phase of Hurricane Katrina is in its emergent phase.  As the 
focus of the nation’s attention to the disaster begins to fade, however, those with political 
and economic power who wish to exploit the situation can operate without fanfare, away 
from the glare of television cameras and public scrutiny.  To continue to view these series 
of devastations as a “natural” disaster rather than one of human, that is societal, 
manufacture, would be to allow such exploitation to happen with impunity.  As a society, 
we would witness without noticing, the massive reshaping of communities with profound 
losses to many and profits for a select few.  We must examine the social ecology of 
Katrina not only to better understand events now in the past, but to aid in formulating a 
recovery that acknowledges the multiple social forces that construct and maintain social 
inequities. 
Social Ecology of Health and Human Service Responses 
 
Employing a social ecology construction of Hurricane Katrina rather than as a 
purely ‘natural’ disaster has implications for how clinicians and other health and human 
service workers can effectively respond to those in most need .  Social workers, 
counselors, psychologists, nurses, doctors and other health and human service workers 
traditionally are deployed after disasters in an effort to mitigate the losses and suffering 
of survivors.  Thousands of people are helped by their efforts.  Yet, if responders only 
focus on the immediate needs of people, and attempt to respond to all persons and 
communities in a neutral fashion, the economic and social inequities and disparities we 
have described will not only be left undisturbed, but further reinforced.  The maxim that 
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the ‘personal is the political’, while always true is particularly salient when responding to 
“natural” disasters.   
Transforming Organizations 
 Many health and human service workers respond by volunteering with national 
and local charities, government entities and non-government organizations (NGOs).  As 
we have argued elsewhere (Park & Miller, In-press), such organizations are never neutral.  
They have their own histories, values and assumptions which shape who responds, which 
populations are reached or not reached and how people are served.  The have their own 
political economies and social ecologies which reflect the “enduring inequalities” (Tilly, 
1998) discussed above.   
 Thus the first place where health and human service workers should try to 
advocate for those who are socially and economically vulnerable is within the 
organizations and agencies which employ or deploy them.  Key questions to ask are who 
receives services, who provides services, and are services culturally responsive?  Due to 
the social ecology of disaster, there is usually greater need in those communities which 
have the greatest vulnerabilities and the fewest resources.  Those communities contain 
the people who have the highest degree of risk – due to age, health status, income 
(Zakour & Harrell, 2003) as well as social, cultural and linguistic isolation.  If services 
are proffered in a general, blanketed fashion such people and communities are less likely 
to hear about, seek and receive services.  Targeted outreach is essential to reaching those 
who are most in need. 
 Cultural responsiveness is also called for.  This includes linguistic competency 
providing familiar goods and services, to understanding worldviews, values and cultural 
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styles. Far too often services are provided with a one size fits all orientation, and the one 
size reflects mainstream, Eurocentric U.S. values and customs.  For example, most of the 
Vietnamese population in Biloxi did not speak English.  Many were not comfortable 
sharing their problems with strangers or talking about feelings in front of their loved 
ones.  They were used to a diet of rice and seafood and yet were receiving supplies of 
peanut butter and MREs.   
 Then there is the issue of who is providing services.  Many large charities and 
government organizations are staffed by white, middle class people (Park & Miller, In-
press).  Until such entities have workers and volunteers who actually look, speak and 
understand the world from the many vantage points of those affected by ‘natural’ 
disasters, it will be difficult to adequately serve non-white, non-middle class 
communities.  Class, race, and ethnic bias are endemic in major relief organizations and 
this will continue to be the case until there are massive shifts in staff diversity.   
 But the task for social workers and other health and human service personnel who 
respond to disasters goes well beyond training the workforce.  It will be necessary for 
disaster relief and response organizations to transform themselves into systems that are 
multi-racial and multi-cultural; that are not bastions of white, Eurocentric privilege.  This 
means completely overhauling of every aspect of these organizations: mission statements, 
personnel practices, staffing and promotion policies (Donner & Miller, 2005).  It will also 
require re-examining the paradigms, theories and concepts used to guide disaster relief.  
For example, the American Red Cross was founded in the 19th century to attend to 
wounded soldiers, a mission that called for neutrality and impartiality (Park & Miller, in-
press).  That perspective is inadequate for organizations that respond to domestic 
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“natural” disasters where great inequality and social divisions existed before the disaster 
and continue after it.  An “impartial” perspective inevitably reinforces and contributes to 
these very social disparities.  What is called for is an approach which grasps the social 
ecology of disasters and actively engages in outreach and culturally responsive services 
to communities that have the greatest need.   
Pre-disaster Planning 
 Health and human service workers are usually deployed after a disaster strikes 
and are involved with disaster mitigation, recovery and rebuilding.  As we have argued, 
the pre-disaster political economy and social ecology greatly influences who is most 
vulnerable and at greatest risk.  Pre-disaster planning involves assessing which people 
and groups live in already vulnerable areas.  Pre-disaster planning is often conducted by 
government bureaucracies, leaving out the voices and ideas of local citizens.  By 
initiating grass roots organizing, clinicians can help people work toward anticipating their 
needs, and mobilizing their resources and assets at times of adversity.  Another way for 
clinical social workers, counselors and therapists to contribute to the mental health of 
potential disaster survivors is to work with major charities and government organizations 
to plan prevention and mitigation strategies before disaster strikes.  Such planning would 
also include developing, training and supporting local, indigenous people as resources for 
their own high risk communities.   
Post-disaster Macro-Planning 
 As clinical social workers ranging from Bertha Reynolds to Jerome Sachs have 
consistently argued, the personal is political and the private troubles of counseling have 
their analogs in public policies and practices.  Most clinicians are deployed after a 
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disaster to offer direct crisis services to individuals, families and groups.  Few are 
engaged in large scale planning, mobilization or decision making.  To some extent , this 
pattern is reinforced by the impulse to do what clinicians have been trained to do: counsel 
and respond to survivors, using their interpersonal skills.  As important as this is, it is 
equally vital to work at the level of systems planning and community intervention to craft 
and implement response and service strategies that are mindful of social ecology and that 
actively seek to achieve greater equity and social justice.  In concrete terms this can mean 
serving as American Red Cross supervisors or managers, or supporting local planning 
councils which have meaningful participation from those who are politically 
underrepresented.   Pre and post disaster planning require that clinicians actively work in 
the political realm and strive to influence organizations, systems and communities.  
Expanding Disaster Discourses 
 Since the discourses surrounding ‘natural’ disasters reinforce biases and 
inadvertently promote inadequate and socially unjust relief efforts, it is essential for 
clinicians to energetically engage in public discourses.  Clinicians are allowed unique 
access to the inner lives and social realities of storm victims, and have not only the 
capacity but the obligation to make the links between their disaster related problems, 
entrenched social oppressions, and inadequate social policies.   
It is astonishing that one of the major discourses after Hurricane Katrina was the 
rediscovery of poverty and racism in the U.S. (Alter, 2005).  The high rates of poverty 
and ingrained patterns of racism and segregation in New Orleans and the surrounding 
areas have been well known to health and human service workers for many decades.  
How is it possible that we were unable to share this knowledge with other U.S. residents?  
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This points to the necessity of engaging in public discourses about social ecology before 
disasters strike, and of taking advantage of the seams in hegemonic, subjugating 
discourses that are opened up by large scale calamities.  If every clinician engaged in 
post-disaster response wrote a narrative which was shared with others – either in a 
professional presentation, letter to the newspaper, op-ed piece, poem, or other form of 
public expression – there would be many voices contesting the pre-disaster consensus of 
normalcy.  It is also important to keep those narratives in the forefront of public 
consciousness.  The newly found awareness of inequality is already fading from the 
public eye and will eventually disappear until the next ‘natural’ disaster lays bare the 
foundations of social inequality.  Ultimately, we hope there will be ongoing discussions 
about the social ecology of disasters at many levels: in organizations, within 
communities, across regions, in state and federal legislatures, and in a variety of media 
sources.   
Conclusion 
 
 We have argued that much about ‘natural’ disasters is un-natural.  And while we 
cannot completely control floods and hurricanes, we do certainly influence the factors 
which increase risk and vulnerability.  We have contested the discourse of “natural”’ 
disasters and have argued that formulating effective pre-disaster plans and post-disaster 
relief programs require the acknowledgement of the social ecology which shape pre-
disaster vulnerability, disaster losses, and the potential for post-disaster recovery.  We 
urge clinical social workers and the many other health and human service workers who 
responded to Hurricane Katrina to continue their work even after their clinical duties are 
over.  We encourage clinicians to take participate in pre-disaster planning and in the 
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implementation of socially just post-disaster services.  Equally important is the sharing 
the stories of their work and of their client’s struggles.  In making the links between those 
struggles and the larger social and political forces of inequality explicit, clinicians can 
actively influence the shape of public discourses.  As Lani Guinier (1998, p.311) has 
stated, “the challenge ahead is to lift more voices,” because “if we succeed, it will be 
because Americans of all walks of life join together, moved by a new vision of social 
justice that they themselves have made.” 
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